Learning from a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining * Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters λ that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is reached, and if so the individual shares) and the environment (including the size of the pie) are known, but neither the agents' utilities nor their threat points. Assuming that the agents adopt a Nash bargaining solution, we investigate the empirical content of this assumption. We first show that in the most general framework, any outcome can be rationalized as a Nash solution. However, if (i) the size of the pie y does not influence the players' threat points and (ii) there exist (at least) two parameters λ 1 and λ 2 that are player-specific, in the sense that λ i does not influence the utility or the threat point of player j ≠ i, then Nash bargaining generates strong testable restrictions. Moreover, the underlying structure of the bargaining, i.e., the players' utility and threat point functions, can be recovered under slightly more demanding conditions. JEL Classification:
Introduction
Consider an experiment in which two agents, 1 and 2, bargain about a pie of size y. If the agents agree on some sharing ( 1 ; 2 ) with 1 + 2 = y, it is implemented. If not, each agent i receives some reservation payment i . Information is complete: each agent knows his opponent's preferences as well as the structure of the game. The interaction is repeated for di¤erent pie sizes and di¤erent reservation payments. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is reached, and if so the individual shares), as functions of the size of the pie and the payments 1 ; 2 , are observable by an outside econometrician; however, individual utilities are not. Assume, …nally, that the econometrician has a prior theory about the agents' behavior; speci…cally, she believes that it can be described using the concept of Nash bargaining (Nash, 1950) . Is this theory testable (i.e., is there a particular set of possible outcomes that would violate the Nash bargaining property), or is it the case that any outcome can be rationalized by a Nash-bargaining setting for wellchosen individual preferences? And how much can be learned about the true structure of the model (i.e., the utility individuals derive from the consumption of either their share of the pie or their reservation payment) from the sole observation of the outcomes? These two questions -the testability of Nash bargaining models and the identi…ability of their underlying structure from observed behavior -are the main topic of this paper.
A possible approach, which is often adopted in the empirical literature on Nash bargaining, is to answer the …rst question by ignoring the second. Indeed, many works arbitrarily assume a speci…c (usually linear) form for individual utilities. Then the sharing function ( 1 = ; 2 = y ) solves the 2 program:
giving the simple, linear form = . Convenient as it may be, this solution totally relies on the linearity assumption; since the Nash bargaining outcome depends on the cardinal representation of individual preferences, any deviation from linear utilities will give a di¤erent form for the resulting shares. 1 This feature is clearly problematic, since the linearity assumption is generally made for convenience rather than realism or theoretical consistency. 2 In particular, any test based on the form (1) is a joint test of two assumptions, one general (Nash bargaining), the other very speci…c (linear utilities). A rejection is likely to be considered as inconclusive, since the burden of rejection can always be put on the speci…c and often ad hoc linearity assumption. For that reason, we believe preferable to adopt the generally accepted rule in empirical economics, whereby preferences should be recovered from the data rather than assumed a priori.
In the present paper, we address these issues in a general framework where the environment is described by a set of parameters that may a¤ect agents'preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. A key role will be played by the econometrician's prior information on the structure of the model at stake. In a non-parametric spirit, this information will be described by some (broad) classes to which the utility or threat point functions are known to belong. We are mainly interested in situations in which this prior information is limited. We thus do not assume that the econometrician knows the parametric form of the utility and threat point functions, but simply that these functions are known to satisfy some exclusion restrictions. 3 Our basic question can thus be precisely restated in the following way: what is the minimum prior information needed to achieve (i) testability of the Nash bargaining theory, and (ii) identi…ability of the underlying structural model.
Regarding the identi…ability issue, an interesting aspect is that Nash so- 1 In the exemple above, for instance, if the utility of agent 1 is U (x) = p x instead of U (x) = x, the solution becomes = p 1 ( 1 + 3y 3 2 ). 2 See Farber (1986, pp. 1056-57) for a discussion of the linear utility framework in the context of union-…rm bargaining. 3 To put it in a Popperian perspective: we do not want the falsi…ability of Nash bargaining to be entirely driven by ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses -such as particular functional forms of individual utility functions.
lutions are not invariant to monotonic transformations of utility functions. It follows that one may, in principle, try to retrieve a cardinal representation of preferences. While the identi…cation of cardinal preferences is a standard problem in economics, our approach is original in that it does not involve uncertainty. Whether concavity of utility functions matter in bargaining because of risk aversion (as might be suggested by the non cooperative foundations of Nash bargaining) or for unrelated reasons is an interesting conceptual problem, on which our …ndings shed a new light.
The empirical content of game theory is undoubtedly a topical issue as illustrated by several recent contributions. For example, Sprumont (2001) considers, from the revealed preferences viewpoint, a non-cooperative game played by a …nite number of players, each of whom can choose a strategy from a …nite set. Ray and Zhou (2001) adopt a similar set-up but focuses on extensive-form games. Other related papers include Sprumont (2002, 2003) , Carvajal (2002) , Carvajal, Ray and Snyder (2004) , Zhou (1999 Zhou ( , 2002 , Ray and Snyder (2003) , Xu and Zhou (2004) . Nonetheless, our contribution di¤ers in many respects from what is generally made. Firstly, our subject matter -the Nash solution -has never been investigated in spite of the various applications of bargaining models in economics. 4 Secondly, our methodology is not based on revealed preferences. The inspiration of the present paper, in fact, is more closely related to the work of Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 and its numerous sequels Ekeland, 2003, 2004) , on the empirical implications of Pareto e¢ ciency. This methodology is probably more appropriate for the empirical implementation of theoretical results. Thirdly, the emphasis of this paper is largely on the identi…cation problem, which is generally ignored by the authors cited above.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next Section, we develop the general model and show that neither testability, nor identi…cation obtain without a priori information on utility and threat point functions. In Section 3, then, we introduce additional structure into the model, and show that testability obtains under mild assumptions on utility and threat point functions. In Section 4, we note that identi…cation requires stronger assumptions, of which several examples are given. We show in particular that in the simple example given above, identi…cation obtains provided that the utility functions do not belong to the exponential family. In Section 5, the possibility of disagreement between players is considered and some additional restrictions on observable behavior are derived. In the concluding Section, we discuss the potential applications of the results.
The general model 2.1 The framework
We consider a bargaining game where two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a vector of l parameters. The outcome of the bargaining game, as a function of the size of the pie and the parameters, is observed. Speci…cally, we assume that the relevant parameters (y; ) vary within some convex, compact subset S of R + R l . Let N denote the subset of S on which one observes that no agreement is reached (so that agents receive their reservation payment), and M = S N its complement. 5 Over M, a sharing is observed, in which player i gets i (y; ), with 1 (y; ) + 2 (y; ) = y. For notational convenience, we de…ne the sharing function as the share of the pie allocated to member 1, i.e., (y; ) = 1 (y; ) (then y (y; ) = 2 (y; )); it is natural to assume that (y; ) 2 [ 0 ; y ] for all (y; ) 2 S. The agents' observed behavior is de…ned by the partition fM; N g of S and the function (y; ) de…ned over M. Let U i ( i ; ) denote i's utility when an agreement is reached and the sharing is implemented. 6 Similarly, let T i (y; ) denote i's threat point, i.e., utility when no agreement is reached and the reservation payments are made. The functions U i ( i ; ) and T i (y; ) may be, in general, di¤erent. We assume throughout the paper that these functions have the following regularity properties.
Assumption S1
(a) The functions U i ( i ; ) are strictly increasing and concave in i .
(b) The functions U i ( i ; ) and T i (y; ) are three times continuously differentiable in all their arguments..
The set of all functions U i ( i ; ) (resp. T i (y; )) that are compatible with the a priori knowledge of the econometrician is denoted by U i (resp.
2 is the information set of the econometrician. We …rst introduce the following de…nition. 
i.e., an agreement is reached if and only if the allocation (T 1 (y; ) ; T 2 (y; )) lies within the Pareto frontier;
in that case, the observed sharing ( 1 = ; 2 = y ) solves:
Note that, in the present set-up, Pareto-e¢ ciency is an initial assumption that cannot be tested. Indeed, our goal is to focus on the other properties (independence of irrelevant alternatives, scale invariance and symmetry) that characterize the Nash solution. Regarding tests of Pareto e¢ ciency (in a di¤erent but related context), the reader is referred to previous papers by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Ekeland (2003, 2004 ).
A negative result
The answers to the two questions raised above -testability and identi…a-bility -obviously depends on the prior information one is willing to exploit in the framework at stake. A …rst result is that the fully general setting, in which the form of utility and threat point functions is not restricted (except 6 for Assumption S1-(a)), is simply too general. The answer to both questions is negative: Nash bargaining cannot generate testable predictions on observed outcomes, and the observation of the outcome does not allow to recover preferences. This is stated formally in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Let (y; ) some function de…ned over M, and whose range is included in [0; y]. Then, for any pair of utility functions U 1 ; U 2 , satisfying Assumption S1-(a), there exist two threat point functions T 1 ; T 2 such that the agents'behavior is compatible with Nash bargaining.
Proof. For any given functions U 1 ; U 2 , satisfying Assumption S1-(a), one can de…ne T 1 ; T 2 by:
Then for any (y; ) in N , no agreement can be reached, whereas for any (y; ) in M, the sharing ( 1 (y; ) ; 2 (y; )) is the only one compatible with individual rationality; thus it is obviously the Nash bargaining allocation.
The intuition of this result is straightforward: it is always possible to chose the status quo utilities (T 1 ; T 2 ) equal to the agents'respective utilities at the observed outcome whenever an agreement is reached (so that, in practice, the chosen point is the only feasible point compatible with individual rationality), while making sure that (T 1 ; T 2 ) is outside the Pareto frontier when agents are observed to disagree. Simple as it may seem, this argument still conveys two important messages. One is that when threat points are unknown, Nash bargaining has no empirical content (beyond Pareto e¢ ciency); any e¢ cient outcome can be reconciled with Nash bargaining. Secondly, the observation of the outcome brings no information on preferences (and in particular the concavity of the utility functions): any utilities can be made compatible with observed outcomes, using ad hoc threat points. Finally, it is important to stress that these negative results are by no means speci…c to Nash bargaining. The proof applies whatever the bargaining concept at stake, provided that it satis…es individual rationality -a very mild requirement indeed.
Bargaining structure
The negative result above does not mean that Nash bargaining (or, for that matter, bargaining theory altogether) cannot be tested, but simply that more structure is needed to achieve that goal. For example, the di¤erentiability of U i and T i (such as required by Assumption S1-(b)) is su¢ cient to obtain some restrictions on the sharing function. However, our interpretation of testability is more demanding. We thus introduce the following 'non-parametric' assumptions on the bargaining structure.
Assumption S2 The threat points are independent of the size of the pie y; i.e., @T i =@y = 0; i = 1; 2.
Assumption S3 There exists a partition = ( 1 ; 2 ; ), with and m 1; n 1, l m + n, such that neither U i nor T i depend on j , where i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j; i.e.,
The additional structure given by these assumptions should a priori increase the empirical content of the bargaining game. Assumption S2 is standard; it is typical, for instance, of situations where, in the absence of an agreement, the opportunity at stake in the bargaining (the pie) is totally lost. Assumption S3 is an exclusion restriction that provides the key structure needed for testability. 7 It states that for each player, there exists one parameter (at least) which does not a¤ect the preferences of this player.
Testability
We now study the properties of the Nash bargaining model under Assumptions S1-S3. For the sake of presentation, we …rst leave aside the situations in which (a) the players disagree or (b) the players are indi¤erent between agreeing and disagreeing. Formally, we thus make the simplifying assumption (which will be relaxed in Section 5) that:
Assumption O1 For any (y; ) 2 S, there exists a sharing ( 1 ; 2 ), with
Hence, an agreement is always reached, i.e., S = M. Moreover, we suppose that when an agreement is reached, each player receives a positive share of the pie. Formally:
Assumption O2 For any (y; ) 2 M, the solution to Programme P is interior, i.e., 0 < i (y; ) < y.
Then, under Assumptions S1-S3, the sharing function is de…ned as a function of (y; ) over the entire space S, and solves the problem:
The …rst order condition of this program is of the form:
with
Our …rst result is that, under these additional speci…cations, the answer to the testability question is now positive. There exist strong testable restrictions on generated by the Nash-bargaining approach. Speci…cally, a …rst, simple result is the following:
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions S1-S2 and O1-O2, if the agents' behavior (fM; N g; ) is compatible with Nash bargaining, then the function (y; ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, with a range included in ]0; y[, and satis…es:
Proof. If equation (3) is di¤erentiated with respect to y, one gets:
It is easily shown that @F i =@ i < 0 for i = 1; 2 since the functions U i are strictly increasing and concave in i . Hence,
A Corollary of Proposition 3 is the following:
Corollary 4 The function can be globally inverted in y on S; i.e., there exists a function ( ; ), de…ned on the relevant space, such that ( (y; ) ; ) = y for all (y; ) in S:
Proof. The result is an immediate consequence of the implicit function theorem.
In words, ( ; ) is the size of the pie that will, for given , result in member 1 receiving a share of size ; from an empirical perspective, observing as a function of (y; ) is exactly equivalent to observing y as a function of ( ; ). It turns out that, from a theoretical viewpoint, many of the properties derived below can be expressed in a much simpler way using the function .
As an illustration, one can derive a second and much stronger testable property of Nash-bargained sharing rules:
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions S1-S3 and O1-O2, if the agents' behavior (fM; N g; ) is compatible with Nash bargaining, then the following, equivalent conditions hold: the function ( ; ) satis…es:
the function (y; ) satis…es:
for all s = 1; :::; m and t = 1; :::; n: (3) can be locally inverted as:
This condition implies that the function ( ; ) is separable:
which immediately implies condition (6) . Expressing this conditions using the function gives condition (7). Finally, one can readily check that a similar computation with F 2 instead of F 1 leads to the same equation.
In other words, Propositions 3 and 5 show that when the econometrician's information about the structure of the game is described by Assumptions 1-3, the Nash bargaining solution can be falsi…ed (in Popper's terms) by observable behavior. Speci…cally, condition (5) states that any increase in the size of the pie must bene…t both agents; it is a direct consequence of Assumption S2. On the other hand, conditions (6) or (7) translate the particular functional structure of equation (3) which de…nes the sharing function. Two remarks are in order at this point. 
for some strictly increasing functions h 1 , h 2 and H, will satisfy conditions (6) (or (7)). The concepts leading to such a maximization include, besides Nash, the Weighted Nash solution with constant bargaining weights, the Egalitarian solution and the Utilitarian solution; interestingly, these concepts all satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. On the contrary, conditions (6) (or (7)) are not satis…ed by the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or the Yu solution, which do not satisfy the IIA property. 8 Remark 2. Even when either the threat point T i or the bargaining surplus U i T i is monotonic in i , it does not follow in general that i's share i increases (or decreases) with i . The reason for that is that since U i also depends on , changing a¤ects the marginal utility of income, which plays a key role in the determination of the solution. It can actually be shown that i is increasing in i if and only if the marginal utility of income @U i =@ i is more elastic with respect to i than the bargaining surplus U i T i . The conditions stated in Propositions 3 and 5 can be exploited to test whether players make use of the Nash solution. To do that, the simplest way is to translate conditions (5) and (6) (or (7)) into parameter constraints of a functional form. An illustration is provided by the following example.
Parametric example 1. For the sake of notational simplicity, we omit and assume that the vectors i are one dimensional. We then choose the following, 'semi-parametric'speci…cation for the sharing function:
where
is the logistic distribution function; in words, the respective shares =y are taken to be logistic transformations of a general second order approximation. This form implies, as expected, that (y; 1 ; 2 ) is necessarily comprises between 0 and y. Moreover, condition (5) is globally satis…ed and condition (6) requires that:
If this restriction is satis…ed, the …rst order condition (3) gives:
exp a 00 + a 01 1 + a 11
Hence an econometric test of the Nash solution, under Assumptions S1-S3, boils down to testing that a 12 = 0. Finally, note that this example can be generalized with an approximation of any arbitrary order.
Identi…cation

A non identi…ability result
We now consider the identi…cation problem; i.e., we ask whether the utility and threat point functions can be retrieved from the observation of the sharing function. Since Nash bargaining is invariant by a¢ ne transformation of individual utilities, we say that utility functions U and U (resp. threat-point functions T and T ) are di¤erent if and only if there does not exist positive scalars a and b such that U = aU + b (resp. T = aT + b). The main conclusion, then, is that the model is not identi…ed; formally:
Proposition 6 Let (y; ) be some twice continuously di¤erentiable function de…ned over S, that satis…es conditions (5) and (7), and whose range is included in ]0; y[. Then there exists a continuum of di¤erent utility functions U 1 ; U 2 and threat point functions T 1 ; T 2 , such that Assumptions S1-S3 are satis…ed and the agents'behavior is compatible with Nash bargaining.
Proof. This proof is in two steps. The (non-)identi…cation of F 1 ; F 2 is …rst examined. The (non-)identi…cation of U 1 ; U 2 ; T 1 ; T 2 then follows.
Part 1.
Consider …rst the case of agent 1. If condition (6) is ful…lled, each ratio
with s = 1; : : : ; m, can be written as some function s of ( 1 ; ; ). Then, the function F 1 de…ned in equation (4) must satisfy:
with @F 1 =@ 6 = 0, where s is a known function. Let K be a level curve of
The existence of K is guaranteed by the implicit function theorem. The system of equations (10) becomes:
, with s = 1; : : : ; m:
It can be shown, if one di¤erentiates this system with respect to 1 and , that cross-derivatives restrictions of the form:
are automatically satis…ed. Hence, this system of partial di¤erential equations has a solution for any initial value and the level curves can be recovered (up to a function of ) using equations (12) . These are monotonic in the sense that K 1 ; > K 1 ; if K < K. Clearly, from these curves and this relation of monotonicity, the function F 1 ( ; 1 ; ) is de…ned up to a transform G( ; ), increasing in its …rst argument. Symmetrically, the function F 2 (y ; 2 ; ) for agent 2 is de…ned up to the same transform G( ; ). That is, assume that some F 1 ( ; 1 ; ) and F 2 (y ; 2 ; ) satisfy equation (3), and de…ne i ( i ; i ; ) = G F i ( i ; i ; ); then:
Note, in particular, that @ F i =@ i < 0 by construction. 
the general solution to equation (13) is of the form:
for an arbitrary, positive function K i i ; , where
does not a¤ect the concavity of utility with respect to income, i.e., the condition above identi…es a cardinal representation of the utility function (as a function of the share). Now, note that:
14 One can assume that i > 0 over the domain at stake (it su¢ ces to de…ne i = exp F i ) so that the expression above is positive. Finally,
The selected G must be such that the term into brackets is negative. Since S is bounded, that can be obtained by the transform i = k exp F i where k > 0 is an arbitrary small constant.
A by-product of the proof is that the conditions stated in Proposition 3 and 5 are su¢ cient as well, in that any sharing rule satisfying these conditions can be rationalized as a Nash bargaining solution for well-chosen utilities and threat points satisfying Assumptions S1-S3. However, the framework falls short of providing a uniqueness result; identi…cation requires still more information. The intuition of this result is that, at best, the functions F Then, one can see that the functions F i are given by:
where G is an arbitrary function. For any choice of G, one can recover the utility functions for arbitrary choices of the threat points. For instance, for G (x) = x, we have that:
where K 1 ( 1 ) and K 2 ( 2 ) are some positive functions. However, this transform is not convenient because the resulting utility functions are not concave. For G (x) = x 1 , we have that:
Then, these expressions correspond to CRRA utility functions if g 1 ; g 2 > 1.
We now provide two examples of additional assumptions that enable to recover the underlying structural model from observed behavior.
Case 1: one a¢ ne utility function
A …rst solution is to assume that the utility of one agent (say, agent 2) is an a¢ ne function of the agent's share of the pie. Formally: Assumption S4. There exists functions and > 0 of 2 ; such that the agent 2's utility function can be written as
This may be the case, for instance, if agent 2 represents a risk-neutral employer who bargains with a trade-union. If so, the Nash program becomes:
where = (T 2 ) = , showing that only the ratio is relevant in the maximization programme. Hence and cannot be identi…ed. Equation (3) becomes:
In this case, the sharing function has to satisfy additional restrictions. To see why, note that the right-hand side of equation (15) 
which further restricts the sharing function.
The most important result is stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions S1-S4 and O1-O2, the knowledge of the sharing i ( ; y) identi…es player 1's utility function U 1 up to an a¢ ne, increasing transform, whose the coe¢ cients are functions of 1 and . In particular, the cardinal representation of the utility of player 1 is exactly identi…ed.
Proof. One has previously shown, in the Proof of Proposition 6 (Part 1), that the functions F 1 and F 2 are de…ned up to the same transform G( ; ), increasing in its …rst argument. However, in the present context, the assumption on U 2 limits the set of such transforms to linear transforms. More precisely, the function G is de…ned by:
where F 1 is a known function. Thus,
which identi…es G up to a function of . Then, using the same argument as in the Proof of Proposition 6 (Part 2), the function U 1 can be retrieved up to an a¢ ne transformation, whose the coe¢ cients depend on 1 and .
Case 2: independent utility functions
The second particular case is a straightforward generalization of the experiment described in Introduction, where 1 and 2 were interpreted as the agents' reservation payments. The speci…c feature we shall keep from the experiment is that 1 and 2 are only relevant for the threat points; they have no direct impact on utilities. We now proceed to show that, in this context, not only additional restrictions are generated on the shape of the sharing function, but both individual utilities and threat points are uniquely recovered (up to the same a¢ ne transform). Formally, we thus introduce the following assumption:
The individual utilities are independent of the parameters 1 and 2 , i.e., @U i =@ i = 0; i = 1; 2: The vectors of parameters 1 and 2 are one dimensional and there is no vector of parameters .
The assumption on the dimensionality of 1 and 2 is made for notational convenience and the parameters are omitted for the same reason. This could be relaxed. Then, under Assumptions S1-S3, S4
0 , the sharing function (y; 1 ; 2 ) thus solves the problem:
We can now state the main result:
is not of the form e i + for some ; ; ). Then, under Assumptions S1-S3, S4 0 and O1-O2, the knowledge of the sharing i (y; ) identi…es U i and T i up to an a¢ ne, increasing transform.
The proof relies on the following Lemma:
Lemma 9 Let F (x; y) be a given function, and assume that for some functions B; C; G the following equation is satis…ed:
Assume that F is such that @F (x; y) =@x 6 = 0; @F (x; y) =@y 6 = 0, and B (x) is not exponential. Then B and C are identi…ed from F up to the same a¢ ne transform.
Proof. The proof of the Lemma is in Appendix. We now show that the Lemma implies Proposition 8. As before, de…ne F 1 and F 2 by
From the Proof of Proposition 6 (Part 1), we know that F i is identi…ed up to some increasing transform; i.e., there exists some known function F i such that:
for some G. It remains to be shown that given the particular form at stake, the knowledge of F i up to an increasing transform is su¢ cient to identify U i and T i . Clearly, Lemma 9 immediately implies the conclusion. Moreover, if B and C are identi…ed up to the same a¢ ne transform, then G (F (x; y)) is exactly identi…ed, hence G as well.
Again, additional testable restrictions are generated by this particular form. These conditions are technical, and we omit them in the present paper. It can be demonstrated, however, that the logistic-quadratic form used in the empirical example above is not compatible with this setting. In other words, an empirical model of bargaining that is using the logistic-quadratic speci…cation must assume (at least implicitly) that individual utilities in case of an agreement depend on the threat point payment -a strong assumption indeed. This remark illustrates the relevance of a preliminary, theoretical investigation. An empirical speci…cation based on the logistic-quadratic form may be quite appealing (and …t the data); but it is internally inconsistent with the model at stake, at least if one assumes (as it seems natural) that agents care about their threat point utility only insofar as it a¤ects the bargaining outcome.
The agreement frontier
In the previous Section, it is assumed that cooperation always generates a positive surplus that can be shared between the players. From now on, we consider a more general case : M S so that the possibility of a disagreement between the players, or an agreement along the boundary of M, can no longer be excluded.
To begin with, it is worth noting that, when (y; ) 2 N , i.e., the players do not agree about the sharing of the pie, the outside econometrician can learn next to nothing about the underlying structure of the bargaining. In particular, the utility functions cannot be identi…ed. The econometrician can only infers from the observation of the disagreement that, whatever the sharing of the pie may be, and for one player at least, the utility obtained from the reservation payment must be higher than what is obtained from the share of the pie.
However, the study of the agreement frontier -the locus where the players are indi¤erent whether the agreement is reached or not -is much more interesting. Indeed, along this frontier, the econometrician observes the sharing of the pie, as a function of the size of the pie and the set of parameters, and knows that, by de…nition, the bargaining surplus is exactly equal to zero. Formally, the agreement frontier is de…ned as follows:
De…nition 10
The agreement frontier F is the subset of (y; ) 2 S such that each agent is indi¤erent between her share of the pie and her reservation payment, i.e.,
for some , with 0 r yg:
The observable agreement frontier F is a subset of F de…ned by M \ cl(N ).
A …rst, trivial result is that the knowledge of the threat points uniquely de…nes utilities (along the observable frontier). More importantly, the agreement frontier, which generated by the structure of the bargaining, should have some features that can be tested. Before examining that, we introduce the following assumption that is used throughout this Section.
Assumption O3 There is some (y; ) 2 S such that each agent is indi¤er-ent between her share of the pie and her reservation payment, i.e., F 6 = ?.
The following Proposition presents a set of testable restrictions which are based on the observation of the sole agreement frontier.
Proposition 11
Under Assumptions S1-S2 and O3, if the agents'behavior (fM; N g; ) is compatible with Nash bargaining, there exists a subset B in R l , and a three times continuously di¤erentiable function ( ) de…ned over B, such that y = ( ) if and only if (y; ) 2 F, and (i) if (y; ) 2 M and 2 B, then y ( ); (ii) if (y; ) 2 N and 2 B, then y < ( ): Moreover, under Assumption S3, the function ( ) is additive in the sense that ( ) = 1 ( 1 ; ) + 2 ( 2 ; ) for some functions 1 ( 1 ; ) and 2 ( 2 ; ).
Proof. Consider the system of equations,
which implicitly de…nes and y as a function of . Inverting (17) with respect to yields: = 
Hence, the sharing function is independent of 2 and y along the agreement frontier. Similarly, inverting (18) with respect to y yields:
Then, substituting equation (19) into equation (20) proves that ( ) is additive in the sense of Proposition 11.
In other words, the …rst part of the Proposition states that the agreement frontier can be equivalently written as:
The players will not agree about the sharing of a pie whose the size is less than a reservation value, given by ( ); and an agreement will occur if the size of the pie exceeds its reservation value. Note that, formally, y < ( ) does not imply that (y; ) 2 N because the reservation value of y may well be outside of S. The second part of the Proposition yields a very strong, testable restriction on the form of the agreement frontier.
Since the results in Proposition 11 are based on the sole observation of the agreement frontier, the econometrician can make a test of Nash bargaining without observing the sharing of the pie (at least if F 6 = ?). However, more can be obtained if the sharing of the pie is observed. This is formally stated in the following Proposition:
Proposition 12 Under Assumptions S1-S3 and O2-O3, if the agents' behavior (fM; N g; ) is compatible with Nash bargaining, then:
for any (y; ) in F and for any s = 1; : : : ; m and any t = 1; : : : ; n:
Proof. As a direct consequence of equations (19) , one has:
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to s 1 and t
gives the conditions in Proposition 12
Finally, note that these conditions are not su¢ cient. Indeed, as previously shown, the functions F i ( i ; i ; ) for i = 1; 2 are de…ned up to some increasing function G. Remember now that
Hence, any particular solution F i ( i ; i ; ) has to satisfy a boundary condition, i.e., lim y! F i ( i (y; ); i ; ) = 1:
Applications
Our main results leads to a signi…cant quali…cation of the widely accepted views that "bargaining theory contains very few interesting propositions that can be tested empirically", to quote Hamermesh (1973, p. 1146). Admittedly, testability and identi…ability do not obtain in the most general model. If the econometrician knows nothing about the form of utility and threat point functions, any sharing of the pie is compatible with Nash bargaining. Nevertheless, whenever utility and threat point functions satisfy some speci…c exclusion property, Nash bargaining generates a set of strong restrictions on observed behavior. An analogy with consumer theory is helpful at that point. As is well-known, a system of demands must satisfy a set of testable restrictions (homogeneity, symmetry, negativity). Still the maximization of utility functions has an empirical content only if utility functions are, quite naturally, assumed to be independent of prices and incomes. A similar condition of exclusion is required in the Nash bargaining context. The pertinence of this condition cannot be judged a priori but depends on the bargaining context. Our results should be considered as a …rst step towards a better understanding of the empirical content of bargaining theory. Potential applications are numerous. A non-exhaustive list of examples is given below.
Trade-union negotiations The objectives of the union and those of the …rms are to some extent in opposition to each other, and the observed outcomes will not in general be precisely the most preferred outcome of either party. This con ‡ict is often solved by assuming a Nash solution. Still the latter has to be supported by empirical arguments. Hence there has been several attempts to test the Nash solution in the sense of seeing if actual negotiated agreements are consistent with the Nash model (see De Menil (1971) , Hamermesh (1973) , Sevjnar (1980 Sevjnar ( , 1986 , Coles and Hildreth (2000) for instance). However, these tests are relatively crude. The objective of the …rm is simply assumed to maximize pro…t. The union is usually assumed to be a rent-maximizer or to have a linear utility function. The message of our paper is that, even without assumptions on the parametric form of utility functions, Nash solutions have a strong empirical content. This sheds a new light on this classical …eld of research.
Of particular interest, in this context, is Proposition 7. Indeed, in many cases the linearity assumption makes sense on the …rm's side. Pro…t maximization is a standard theoretical assumption, and risk neutrality can be derived from speci…c assumptions on, say, …nancial markets. The same assumption, however, is more debatable when made for the workers. Our results show that the latter assumption is by no means necessary. Not only can Nash bargaining be tested without this assumption, but the union's preferences (and in particular the degree of concavity of their utility) can in principle be identi…ed from the outcome of the negotiation.
Household behavior During the last two decades, several models of household behavior accounting for the fact that spouses' goals may di¤er have emerged. Speci…cally, Chiappori (1988a Chiappori ( , 1992 relies on the sole assumption that the intrahousehold decision process is e¢ cient, while Manser and Brown (1980) , McElroy and Horney (1981) and Lundberg and Pollak (1993) refers to some cooperative equilibrium concept (typically Nash bargaining). Since Nash-bargaining generates e¢ cient outcomes, the second approach is a particular case of the …rst. An interesting problem is whether (and under which conditions) the additional structure provided by Nash-bargaining results in either additional testable predictions on behavior, or a more accurate identi…cation of individual preferences and decision processes. 9 Our results suggest that the answer depends on the level of structure one is willing to introduce into the model. Proposition 2 implies that the Nash bargaining assumption, per se, implies very little beyond e¢ ciencya conclusion already conjectured by Chiappori (1991) . More surprisingly, however, Proposition 5 suggests that mild assumptions may be su¢ cient to reverse this conclusion. For instance, in a model with purely private consumption, in which the decision process can be decentralized, the form of the so-called sharing rule may indeed be constrained by the Nash bargaining context, even when the threat points are not explicitly speci…ed. 10 Experimental economics The investigation of bargaining theory in experimental economics dates back to the seminal works by Siegel and Fouraker (1960) . A standard problem with experiments of this type is that the observer does not know the players' preferences. As we said in Introduction, assuming linear preferences may unduly restrict the scope of the test: a joint test of Nash bargaining and linear preferences is likely to be rejected just because preferences fail to be linear -and then the rejection tells very little about the status of the Nash bargaining hypothesis.
A possible solution, introduced by Roth and Malouf (1979) , is to consider players who bargain about probabilities of a lottery. The idea, here, is that linearity immediately follows from the expected utility hypothesis. Note, however, that once again one jointly tests Nash bargaining and expected utility. Given that expected utility tends to be rejected in experiments, once again the status of the test (as a test of Nash bargaining) is ambiguous at best.
From this point of view, the methodology developed in this paper opens new and interesting directions for future research in this area. Consider again the simple experiment discussed in Introduction. Our main conclusion is that a cardinal representation of each agent's utility function can be identi…ed from it. This identi…cation does not require any form of uncertainty; in particular, it does not rely on the assumption that utilities are of VNM type. Moreover, the Nash bargaining structure generates strong testable properties for the sharing function.
The possibility of identifying a cardinal representation of individual utilities in the absence of uncertainty raises interesting perspectives. The mere fact that Nash bargaining involves cardinal representations of individual utilities (i.e., concavity matters) even in the absence of uncertainty can be given various interpretations. One of these relies on the non-cooperative foundations of Nash bargaining, which do involve randomness.
11 While interesting, this interpretation raises however several problems. First, the noncooperative interpretation provided by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky relies on expected utility. This requirement is somewhat problematic: it is hard to see why the use of Nash bargaining should be restricted to preferences compatible with expected utility maximization, rather than more general preferences under uncertainty. Recent progress have been made in this direction by Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson (1992) , who extend the interpretation of Nash-bargaining to a family of non-expected utility preferences. Still, why the de…nition of Nash bargaining should rely at all on preferences on lotteries is not clear. After all, non cooperative models are not the only justi…cation of Nash bargaining, and possibly not the most convincing one. The initial de…nition of Nash bargaining was axiomatic; and none of the axioms used by Nash in his original contribution did rely on decision under uncertainty in any manner. Moreover, Nash bargaining is used in a variety of situations, most of which involve no uncertainty. 12 In other words, the interpretation just described, based on the idea that concavity of the utility function matters in Nash bargaining because Nash bargaining should be viewed as a reduced form for some non cooperative game that does involve randomness, needs not be the ultimate one. It should in particular be put in perspective with a standard claim made by (some) tenants of non expected utility approaches, and stating that concavity of utility has little to do with risk aversion. Decreasing marginal utility of income, it is argued, relates to psychological patterns of individual satisfaction that can be understood independently of any risk. Risk aversion, in this perspective, is a completely di¤erent issue, which is (at least in some versions) related to transformations of the probability distribution.
The theoretical debate is both stimulating, challenging and intricate. However, a very interesting question is whether there could be an empiri-cal answer to the debate. In other words, could there be a way of directly testing the relationship between decreasing marginal utility of income and risk aversion? The obvious problem with such a program is that the decreasingness of marginal utility of income is hard (or impossible, it is often argued) to assess in a context of certainty. Our suggestion is that Nash bargaining may actually provide such an assessment. We believe, in other words, that it may be worth trying to take the theory literally and trying to recover the concavity of individual utilities from the observation of negotiations between agents in the absence of uncertainty. From this perspective, the tools provided by this paper may be useful precisely because they show how individual utilities can be retrieved (up to an a¢ ne transform) in a bargaining context.
Whether the level of concavity implicit in the Nash bargaining outcome is correlated with the individuals'attitude toward risk is an interesting empirical question. After all, the same person may in principle be a tough negotiator and a risk averse decision maker. At any rate, an experiment should be easy to perform. It should go along the following lines:
1. face each individual of a given group with a standard choice between lotteries, in order to assess her level of risk aversion 2. match randomly the agents by pairs, and let them play a two-sided bargaining problem identical to the one discussed in Introduction; use the theoretical approach described in this paper to recover their utility functions 3. compare the two sets of results. According to the standard interpretation, more risk averse individuals, being characterized by more concave VNM utilities, should perform poorly in the bargaining stage; an empirical check of this prediction would be quite illuminating.
4. Interestingly enough, this approach has various by-products. For instance, the idea that risk aversion has more to do with probability transformation than with decreasing marginal utility of consumption could be taken to data in a systematic way: if one believes that the concavity retrieved from the second phase has general relevance, then it can be plugged into the …rst stage to recover possible probability transformations.
Experiments of this kind will be the topic of future work.
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A Appendix : Proof of Lemma 9
In this appendix, the notation f x stands for the di¤erential of function f with respect to variable x; the notation f 0 is used when f has only one argument. Note …rst that G (F (x; y) ) is of the form:
where A (x) = B 0 (x). It follows that
De…ne:
(x; y) = F x (x; y) F y (x; y) :
Note that is a known function, i.e., it does not depend on G, and is such that log (x; y) = log @F (x; y) @x log @F (x; y) @y :
Consider equation (21) as an equation in A = B 0 ; B; C. We now show that generically on , this equation identi…es B; C up to an a¢ ne transform. We now distinguish two cases, depending on whether log (x; y) = log (F x (x; y)) log (F y (x; y)) is additively separable in x and y or not. CASE 1 (GENERAL CASE): log (x; y) is not additively separable in x and y. The proof goes in 3 steps
Step 1: De…ne v (x) = A 0 (x)=A (x) and w (x) = v (x) B (x) B 0 (x), then equation (21) 
Di¤erentiating with respect to x yields:
x (x; y) C 0 (y) + v 0 (x)C (y) = w 0 (x):
If
x (x; y) v (x) (x; y) v 0 (x) = 0; 27 then (x; y) = D (y) v (x) for some function D and log (x; y) is additively separable in x and y which contradicts the assumption. Hence the expression is non zero, and from equations (22) and (23) one gets:
C (y) = x (x; y) w (x) (x; y) w 0 (x)
x (x; y) v (x) (x; y) v 0 (x) ;
x (x; y) v (x) (x; y) v 0 (x) :
A …rst necessary condition expresses the fact that the derivative of the righthand-side of equation (24) equals the right-hand-side of equation (25) . This gives either
x (x; y) v (x) + y (x; y) x (x; y) xy (x; y) (x; y) (x; y) v 0 (x) = 0:
If (w 0 (x) v (x) v 0 (x) w (x)) = 0, then C 0 (y) = 0 and F y (x; y) = 0, which is excluded by assumption. Hence x (x; y) v (x) (x; y) v 0 (x) = xy (x; y) (x; y) y (x; y) x (x; y) : (26)
Step 2: Di¤erentiating equation (26) with respect to y gives xy (x; y) v (x) y (x; y) v 0 (x) = xyy (x; y) (x; y) yy (x; y) x (x; y) : (27) If y (x; y) x (x; y) = xy (x; y) (x; y) ; then (x; y) is of the form D (x) E (y) and again log (x; y) is additively separable in x and y which contradicts the assumption. Hence the system (26) and (27) This de…nes A (x) up to some multiplicative constant a, and generate testable conditions since the right hand side cannot depend on x.
Step 3: In our case, A (x) = B 0 (x), so B(x) is identi…ed from A(x) up to some additive constant b : 
